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Abstract
This paper studies information transmission between an uninformed decision maker
(receiver) and an informed player (sender) who have asymmetric beliefs ("con-
dence") on the senders ability ("competence") to observe the state of nature. We nd
that even when the material payo¤s of are perfectly aligned, the senders over- and
undercondence on his information give rise to information loss in communication,
although they do not by themselves completely eliminate information transmission
in equilibrium. However, an undercondent sender may prefer no communication to
informative communication. We also show that when the sender is biased, overcon-
dence can lead to more information transmission and welfare improvement.
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1 Introduction
When we learn new information and access its reliability, we often take into account the in-
formation providers competence. However, the information provider and his audience may
not always agree on how competent or how well-informed he actually is. This disagreement
can be understood as a manifestation of over- and undercondence in communication. For
example, various experts (consultants, securities analysts, lawyers etc.) are often accused
of being overcondent about their ability or the quality of information they have. On
the other hand, undercondence (shyness, low self-esteem) is yet another type of obstacle
to communication that troubles a number of individuals in society. Such communication
apprehension can occur when a sender underestimates his ability or the relevance of his
knowledge, and becomes excessively afraid of the audiences reaction to his message. How
do over- and undercondence a¤ect the nature of communication? Do they enhance or
diminish information transmission? If so, how? Is more informative communication always
better? How do over- and undercondence interact with the senders (intrinsic) "bias",
which has attracted much attention in the literature on information transmission?
This paper addresses these questions by incorporating asymmetric beliefs ("condence")
on the quality of the senders information ("competence") into the standard cheap talk
model of Crawford and Sobel (1982). We nd that overcondence leads to the senders
incentive to "exaggerate" and send an extreme report, while undercondence gives rise to
incentive to "moderate" his report.1 When communicating with an overcondent sender,
the receiver discounts the quality of the senders report. That is, in making her decision
the receiver puts less weight on the senders message than the sender wants the receiver
to. In order to inuence the decision in the face of the discounting, the sender is tempted
to send an extreme message, but in equilibrium this results in the feature that extreme
messages are less informative than moderate ones. In contrast, the receiver values the
information held by an undercondent sender more than the sender himself does. As a
1By incentive to "exaggerate", we mean a senders incentive to misreport in such a way that, if his mes-
sage refers directly to the value of a signal and is believed literally by the receiver, the sender "overstates"
("understates") the signal when it is high (low) relative to the prior expectation.
Similarly, incentive to "moderate" is a senders incentive to misreport in such a way that, if his message
is believed literally, he "understates" ("overstates") the signal when it is high (low).
In cheap talk games messages used are completely arbitrary and do not have to be taken literally. What
matters for the equilibrium outcome is the correspondence between the signal an expert has observed and
the receivers action, so what word (or language) is used to induce a particular action is irrelevant to the
equilibrium construction.
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result, the sender wants to weaken his inuence on the receivers decision, and hence the
sender has incentive to "moderate" his report relative to the actual information he has. In
equilibrium, moderate messages become less informative than extreme ones.
At the same time, we show that severe overcondence and severe undercondence have
a marked similarity as they both may lead to the use of binary communication (e.g. "yes or
no", "agree or disagree"), despite the very di¤erent nature of the informational distortions
they cause. Binary communication is shown to be robust to both over- and undercondence
since it suppresses any incentive to "exaggerate" or "moderate".
We also introduce an intrinsic bias of the sender, which represents the di¤erence be-
tween the ideal decision of the sender and that of the receiver (who makes the decision)
if they shared the same complete information on the state. It is well known that such
bias reduces information transmission when there is no over- or undercondence. In this
paper we demonstrate that, while both overcondence and undercondence also reduce
the quality of communication in the absence of bias, slight overcondence on the part of
the sender enhances information transmission whenever he is moderately biased. More-
over, overcondence may increase the prospect of informative communication when he is
severely biased.
One striking feature of undercondence in communication is that, when their expected
utilities are computed according to their (asymmetric) beliefs, the sender may be better
o¤ with no communication than with informative communication even if both are perfect
Bayesian equilibria. The receiver is always better o¤ with more information transmission,
so that multiple equilibria may not be Pareto ranked in communication with an undercon-
dent sender. This may provide a strategic basis for "communication apprehension" (or
"communication avoidance") by people with undercondence or low self-esteem. That is,
if an undercondent agent can choose whether to participate in a communication game, he
may strictly prefer not to do so, since equilibrium communication in the game may hurt
himself. This is in contrast to the standard cheap talk models, where the worst that can
happen to the sender is "babbling" (no information transmission) so that he weakly prefers
playing the communication game to staying out of the game.
Another interesting characteristic of communication with an undercondent sender is
that the receiver too may be better o¤in an equilibrium where a smaller number of messages
is used. Specically, we show that the receiver may prefer the equilibrium with binary
messages to an equilibrium with more messages. The intuition is very simple. Consider a
situation where three messages are used in equilibrium ("yes, Im not sure, or no"). When a
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sender is severely undercondent, he sends a moderate message ("Im not sure") most of the
time, which makes communication hardly informative from the receivers viewpoint. On
the other hand in a binary communication equilibrium the sender has to choose either of the
two messages ("yes or no") and the receiver may nd this more informative than the three
message equilibrium where the agent sends the moderate message ("Im not sure") with
a very high probability. Roughly speaking, when communicating with an undercondent
person, one may prefer not to give him a chance to send a moderate message.
Overcondence has been attracting much attention from psychologists and economists.
The literature on judgement under uncertainty has found that people tend to be overcon-
dent about the information they have, in that their subjective probability distributions
on relevant events are too tight (Kahneman et al., 1982; Cesarini, Sandewall, and Jo-
hannesson, 2004). Overcondence has been found in various professions such as lawyers
(Wagenaar and Karen, 1982), policy experts (Tetlock, 1999), and security analysts (Chen
and Jiang, 2006). The implications of overcondence for economic choices and especially
for nancial markets have been studied recently by numerous researchers (e.g. Kyle and
Wang, 1997; Gervais and Odean 1998; Daniel et al., 1998; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003).
Hvide (2002) o¤ers a theoretical argument for the endogenous emergence of overcondence.
Despite its prevalence, undercondence is much less pronounced in the economic lit-
erature, and this paper provides a rst approach to study both over and undercondence
within a simple framework. Psychologists have analyzed how low self-esteem and shyness,
which can be considered as an important aspect of undercondence, become an obstacle
to communication (e.g. Richmond and McCroskey, 1997; Zimbardo, 1990). We are able to
o¤er a game theoretic analysis of the nature of di¢ culties in communication with undercon-
dent individuals, and also can explain their tendency to avoid communication as we show
that an undercondent sender may indeed be better o¤ with no communication than with
informative communication, even if engaging in communication itself is completely cost-
less. In experimental settings, Gri¢ n and Tversky (1992) document how overcondence
and undercondence arise systematically in the context of evidence assessment. Hoelzl and
Rustichini (2005) have found that people tend to be undercondent particularly with unfa-
miliar tasks. Undercondence can potentially be important even for professional experts.
In medical profession, Friedman et al. (2004) have found that physicians are more likely
to be undercondent about their diagnoses than to be overcondent.
In order to model the level of condence, we allow for asymmetric beliefs on the prob-
ability that the sender observes the true state of nature. In other words, the receiver and
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the sender may not share the same "condence" on the senders "competence" though
they are fully aware of the di¤erence in beliefs. Since we do not have to specify which
player a priori has the correct belief, our framework can be applied to communication with
"over-reliance" or "under-reliance" on the senders information, for which a sender is often
supposed to hold the correct belief and his audience does not.
Recent papers that involve asymmetric beliefs (non-common priors) include Admati
and Peiderer (2004), Fang and Moscarini (2005), Van den Steen (2005), and Che and
Kartik (2009), among others. Fang and Moscarini (2005) consider the e¤ect of workers
overcondence in their skills on wage policies, and Van den Steen (2005) examines worker
incentives when a worker may disagree with the manager regarding the best course of
action. Che and Kartik (2009) develop a veriable disclosure model between a decision
maker and agent who have asymmetric prior beliefs about the state, and study the agents
incentive for information acquisition.
The closest to the present paper is Admati and Peiderer (2004) who study an infor-
mation transmission game where the sender can be overcondent in his ability to observe
the true state. They argue that in communication with an overcondent sender extreme
messages or ratings are less precise because if the sender reports the truth honestly, from
his viewpoint the receivers reaction is too weak and the sender has incentive to send an
extreme report. Admati and Peiderer (2004) focus on overcondence and do not consider
undercondence. Also they assume that the sender is otherwise unbiased: if the sender
and the receiver agree on the senders ability the partiesinterests are perfectly aligned.
Thus they are unable to address the question how the intrinsic bias of a sender, which
has been a focus of attention in the information transmission literature (and an important
concern in practice), interacts with his condence in his competence. In the present paper
we analyze undercondence as well as overcondence in a systematic way. Moreover we
explicitly illustrate the interaction between condence and the intrinsic bias. Also, while
Admati and Peiderer (2004) restrict the message space in such a way that the sender
chooses one of an exogenously given nite set of messages, we do not impose such a re-
striction on the message space. Hence we are able to study more naturally how much
information a sender can possibly communicate credibly, depending on his condence and
bias. This also enables us to examine interesting issues with multiple equilibria, especially
in communication with an undercondent sender.
Although our model is an extension of the canonical model of Crawford and Sobel (1982)
we cannot simply adopt their equilibrium characterization because the senders incentive
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to misreport may not point in the same direction. Recently Gordon (2010) has provided
the general characterization of a class of cheap talk equilibria where the senders bias can
depend on his information. While he is mainly concerned with equilibrium characterization
itself, our focus in the present paper is on how parameters regarding condence and intrinsic
bias alter the nature of communication.
We observe that overcondence and undercondence lead to di¤erent structures of in-
formative equilibria. The informative equilibria with overcondence are closely related
to communication with noise (Krishna and Morgan, 2004; Blume, Board and Kawamura,
2007; Goltsman, Horner, Pavlov, and Squintani, 2009), where the receiver puts less weight
on a message than in communication without noise, because due to noise the received mes-
sage may not necessarily be informative about the state. In the absence of intrinsic bias,
weak response to a message leads to the senders incentive to "exaggerate" his message
relative to the prior expected state. A similar intuition has been developed by Kawa-
mura (2011) in a multiple sender setting. This type of informational distortion appears in
communication with an overcondent sender too, as we have already mentioned above.
On the other hand, informative equilibria in communication with an undercondent
sender shares an important feature with "reputational cheap talk" (Ottaviani and Sørensen,
2006a,b; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006), where the sender attempts to look more able
through messages when his quality is unknown to the receiver but known to the sender
himself. In order to appear to be of high quality, the sender with reputational concerns has
incentive to report messages that are closer to the prior, which also arises in communication
with an undercondent sender for a di¤erent reason.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model,
and Section 3 characterizes the equilibria. The e¤ects of over- and undercondence in the
absence of bias are studied in Section 4 and Section 5 examines the interplay between
condence and bias. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
Our analysis builds on the "uniform-quadratic" model of Crawford and Sobel (1982, hence-
forth CS). There is an uninformed receiver and a sender who observes a private signal on
the state of nature. Both partiespayo¤s depend on the receivers action y 2 R and the
uniformly distributed state  2 [0; 1]. The senders utility function is US =  (y      b)2
and that of the receiver is UR =  (y )2, where b represents the senders bias. We assume
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b  0 without loss of generality.
Before the receiver chooses her action, the sender observes a private signal  2 [0; 1] on
the state . After observing the signal, the sender reports a costless, unveriable message
m 2M . Following convention we often refer to  as the senders "type".
CS assume that the sender observes the true state with probability 1, which is common
knowledge. Now we introduce asymmetric beliefs ("condence") on the quality of the signal
(the senders "competence") as follows: the receiver believes that  =  with probability p,
and  has the identical (i.e. uniform on [0; 1]) but independent distribution with probability
1  p. That is, with probability 1  p the signal is uninformative about the state. On the
other hand the sender believes that  =  with probability c, and  has the identical
but independent distribution with probability 1  c: In other words, the parties may have
di¤erent beliefs on the probability that the signal observed by the sender coincides with
the true state. Moreover they fully recognize the di¤erence in their beliefs. That is, c and
p are common knowledge.2
In terms of the level of condence and intrinsic bias, our model is more general than the
formulation by Admati and Peiderer (2004), who also adopt a similar uniform-quadratic
setting, in that we introduce the senders intrinsic bias b, and we also allow for the possibility
that c < p as well as c  p. In our notation, the widely known uniform-quadratic example
of CS assumes b  0, p = c = 1,3 and Admati and Peiderer (2004) assume b = 0, c = 1
and p  1.4
For expositional convenience, throughout this paper we look at the level of the senders
condence from the receivers perspective. If c > p the sender is said to be overcondent
since the sender believes that his signal is more accurate (i.e. he is more competent)
than the receiver believes. Likewise if c < p he is undercondent. However, since we
are interested in how the di¤erence between c and p a¤ects communication, we are not
concerned with which party has the correct belief on the senders ability. It could be
2What is important for the intuition behind our results we develop later is the natural and intuitive
feature that, the less competent the sender is, the less weight should be put on his signal relative to the prior
distribution/expectation. Our formulation of c and p should be thought of as a tractable representation
of this feature.
3For their general setup CSs equilibrium characterization covers wider parameter values, which we will
use later for Proposition 1.
4Note also that Admati and Peiderer (2004) impose an exogenous restriction on the number of the
receivers actions induced in equilibrium, while it is determined endogenously in our model. Admati
and Peiderer (2004) allow for general distributions of the state/signal and focus on studying how the
distributions a¤ect information transmission.
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that neither party does, but this is not important since we calculate the playersexpected
utilities according to their own subjective beliefs. If we look at the model from the senders
viewpoint and assume that he holds the correct belief, c > p and c < p could be respectively
called "under-reliance" and "over-reliance" on a sender. Later we conduct welfare analysis
using the expected utilities according to each players subjective belief.
Let us derive communication equilibrium and examine how the nature of information
transmission (i.e. messages communicated in equilibrium) changes depending on the values
of b, c, and p. In what follows we look for equilibrium strategies where each party maximizes
expected utility according to his/her subjective beliefs on the senders competence. Given
the message the receiver updates her (subjective) belief using Bayesrule.
From the receivers viewpoint a message from the sender is informative about the state
of nature with probability p. Otherwise the message is completely uninformative. Since
neither the receiver nor the sender knows whether the sender has observed the true state
of nature, the receivers maximization problem after she has received the message is given
by
max
y
E[UR j m; y] = pE[ (y   )2 j m]| {z }
=
+ (1  p)
Z 1
0
 (y   )2d| {z }
U [0;1]
= p
 (y   E[ j m])2   var( j m)+ (1  p)Z 1
0
 (y   )2d;
where E [ j m] and var( j m) are the expectation and variance of the signal conditional
on the message, respectively. Since the utility function is quadratic, what matters for the
receivers choice is the posterior expectation of the signal (and the state). Hence the rst
order condition for her best response conditional on the message yields
y(m) = pE [ j m] + (1  p)1
2
: (1)
E [ j m] is weighted at p because the receiver believes that  is independent of the true
state with probability 1  p.
Before deriving the senders best response, let us consider his desired action. Given the
signal, from the senders viewpoint  =  with probability c and otherwise  is uniform on
[0; 1]. Thus his desired action is given by maximizing expected utilityE[US j ]:
max
y
E[US j ; y] = c ( (y      b)2)| {z }
=
+ (1  c)
Z 1
0
 (y      b)2d| {z }
U [0;1]
:
8
The rst order condition for the sender gives his desired action given 
yS() = c + (1  c)1
2
+ b: (2)
Hypothetically, suppose that the sender fully reveals his signal. Then, since E [ j m] = ,
(1) implies that the receivers desired action is
yR() = p + (1  p)1
2
: (3)
Let us dene ^ to be the signal such that the partiesdesired actions coincide: yS(^) =
yR(^). From (2) and (3) we obtain
^ =
1
2
  b
c  p .
We call ^ the agreement type. We may have ^ 2 [0; 1] only when c 6= p and b is not too
large. In the CS model (c = p) both partiesdesired actions never coincide for b > 0: we
have yS() > yR() for all .
An important feature when we have ^ 2 [0; 1] is that the di¤erence between the parties
desired actions may not be consistently negative or positive. As a result if the sender is
overcondent (c > p) we have yS() > yR() for  > ^ and yS() < yR() for  < ^:
if the receiver takes a reports literally and naively believes it, the sender has incentive to
"overstate" his signal for  > ^ and incentive to "understate" it for  < ^.5 In the previous
section we have referred to them as incentive to "exaggerate" since when  is higher (lower)
than ^ the sender wants to convince the receiver that  is even higher (lower).
In contrast, if the sender is undercondent (c < p) we have yS() < yR() for  > ^
and yS() > yR() for  < ^. Now the sender has incentive to "understate" his signal for
 > ^ and incentive to "overstate" it for  < ^. We have referred to them together as
incentive to send "moderate" messages since when  is higher (lower) than ^ the sender
wants to convince the receiver that  is lower (higher) and closer to ^ than it actually is.
3 Equilibrium
We have seen that the possibility of c 6= p substantially alters the structure of the senders
incentive to misreport. If c = p and b > 0, we have yS() > yR() for all . For this case CS
have shown that under general assumptions on preferences and distribution every perfect
5As we have noted in Footnote 1, in this game the messages are arbitrary and do not necessarily have
to refer literally to the values of signals.
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Bayesian equilibrium of the cheap talk game is partitional, in that the type (signal) space is
divided into a nite number of intervals and all types in an interval induce the same action.
The equilibrium characterization is generalized further by Gordon (2010) to cases where,
as in our model, the partiesdesired actions may coincide for a certain type (the agreement
type ^ 2 [0; 1] in our model). The receivers best response (1) and the senders desired
action (2) imply that our model constitutes a case of the admissible problem formulated
and analyzed by Gordon (2010), and we can apply his equilibrium characterization to our
model. Therefore following CS and Gordon (2010) we are able to characterize equilibria
using an "arbitrage" condition, which says that an equilibrium partition is determined in
such a way that any boundary type is indi¤erent between the actions induced by the types
in the interval on left hand side and those in the interval on the right hand side.
Let a and a be two points in [0; 1] such that a < a. Suppose that the sender observes
 2 [a; a). Dene y(a; a) to be the receivers best response given her belief  2 [a; a). Since
 is uniformly distributed (1) implies
y(a; a) = p
a+ a
2
+ (1  p)1
2
: (4)
In an equilibrium partition with N intervals, each boundary ai must satisfy an "arbitrage"
condition, which says that the sender with  = ai must be indi¤erent between inducing
y(ai 1; ai) and y(ai; ai+1):
 c(y(ai 1; ai)  ai   b)2 + (1  c)
Z 1
0
 (y(ai 1; ai)     b)2d
=  c(y(ai; ai+1)  ai   b)2 + (1  c)
Z 1
0
 (y(ai; ai+1)     b)2d: (5)
By using (4), (5) can be written
pai+1   (4c  2p)ai + pai 1 = 4b  2(c  p). (6)
This second-order di¤erence equation describes the (unique) equilibrium partition for given
c, p, b, and N where
a0 = 0; aN = 1 (7)
and ai < ai+1 for all i 2 f0; 1; 2; :::; N   1g. In what follows we refer to an equilibrium
with at least two non-degenerate intervals as an informative equilibrium, where at least
two di¤erent actions are induced with positive probability.
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Before we formally describe equilibria, let us observe their interesting characteristics
with respect to the levels of condence and competence, c and p. (6) can be rewritten as
(ai+1   ai)  (ai   ai 1) = 4b  2(c  p)
p
+
4(c  p)
p
ai, (8)
which represents the di¤erence in the length of two adjacent intervals. It is easy to check
that the right hand side of (8) is 0 when ai = ^, the agreement type. This implies that i)
the size of the intervals becomes larger as they are away from the agreement type when
the sender is overcondent ; and ii) the size of the intervals becomes smaller as they are
away from the agreement type when the sender is undercondent. Suppose that b = 0
so that ^ = 1=2. In this case, (8) indicates that a moderate message (i.e. message
closer to the average) is more informative than an extreme message in communication
with an overcondent sender (because the size of intervals tends to be larger), while a
moderate message is less informative than an extreme message in communication with an
undercondent sender. This reects our earlier observation that an overcondent sender
has incentive to "exaggerate" while an undercondent one has incentive to "moderate"
messages.
Note that the qualitative characteristics of informative equilibria we have been able
to extrapolate from (6) apply to any informative equilibria for given parameter values.
As we will see later (6) and (7) can generate multiple equilibria with varying degrees of
informativeness (in terms of ex ante expected welfare) but whether the size of the intervals
become smaller or larger with respect to the distance from the agreement type does not
depend on which informative equilibrium we focus on.
We formally describe the set of all equilibria in the following proposition. Let the
senders strategy specify the probability of sending message m 2M conditional on observ-
ing signal  and we denote it by q(m j ). The receivers best response is given by y(m)
in (1).
Proposition 1
i) Suppose that ^ =2 [0; 1] or that ^ 2 [0; 1] and c < p. Then there exists an integer
N such that, for every integer N with 1  N  N , there exists at least one equilibrium
(y(m); q(m j )), where q(m j ) is uniform, supported on [ai; ai+1] if  2 (ai; ai+1);
y(m) = y(ai; ai+1) for all m 2 (ai; ai+1); and (7) and (6) hold. Moreover, no equilibrium
with N > N exists.
ii) Suppose that c  p and ^ 2 [0; 1]. Then for every positive integer N there exists at
least one equilibrium (y(m); q(m j )), where q(m j ) is uniform, supported on [ai; ai+1]
11
if  2 (ai; ai+1); y(m) = y(ai; ai+1) for all m 2 (ai; ai+1); and (7) and (6) hold.
All other equilibria are outcome equivalent to the ones identied above.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proposition says that, regardless of the condence levels c and p, the perfect
Bayesian equilibria of this game are partitional. Note in particular that Part ii) of the
proposition implies that when the sender is overcondent and the agreement type is in the
type space, i.e. ^ 2 [0; 1], there always exists an equilibrium with an innite number of
intervals. However, if the sender is undercondent (c < p) the number of intervals is always
nite. The outcome equivalence means that other equilibria can involve di¤erent messages
to be communicated, but they all have to feature the same correspondence between the
signal  and action y, for given N .
 Common Condence Benchmark (c = p)
If both parties have the same level of condence about the senders competence (probability
that the sender observes the true state) we have c = p. Substituting this into (6) the
equilibrium partitions in this case are given by
ai+1   2ai + ai 1 = 4b
p
: (9)
Under common condence the only di¤erence from CS is that we may have p < 1 while
they assume p = 1. If b = 0, we have yR = yS for any  and hence full revelation is possible
in equilibrium because both partiesinterests are perfectly aligned. Rewriting (9) we have
(ai+1   ai) = (ai   ai 1) + 4bp . In other words, the equilibrium partitions are such that an
interval becomes longer as  becomes larger. A message is less informative about the signal
(or state) when the sender observes higher . This reects the assumption that the sender
is positively biased (b > 0). As in other cheap talk models there are multiple equilibria,
including the "babbling" equilibrium where a0 = 0 and a1 = 1 so that no information is
transmitted. We will discuss the issue of multiple equilibria later.
Let us dene b to be the level of intrinsic bias such that an informative equilibrium exists
for any b 2 [0;b). This can be obtained by checking at what value of b the equilibrium
with two non-degenerate intervals can be supported. Substituting a0 = 0 and a2 = 1 into
(9) we obtain a1 = 12   2bp . Hence a1 > 0 implies that an informative equilibrium exists if
b < bc=p  p4 .
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Remark 1 Suppose condence and competence coincide (c = p). If b = 0, then there
exists a fully revealing equilibrium exists. For b > 0, the less competent the sender is, the
less bias is allowed for equilibrium communication to be informative.
When p is lower (4) implies that the message has less impact on the receivers action.
This makes the relative size of intrinsic bias b with respect to the inuence of a message (and
signal) larger. As a result, given the level of b, lower p leads to more limited information
transmission. Later we use bc=p as a benchmark to consider how over- and undercondence
interacts with bias in communication.
4 E¤ects of Over- and Undercondence
Let us focus on how over- and undercondence alone a¤ect equilibrium communication,
in the absence of bias. We rst consider the distortion of communication due to over- and
undercondence, and then examine their welfare implications.
4.1 Information Distortion and Binary Communication
When a sender is overcondent (c > p) and b = 0, from (2) and (3) we have seen that the
sender has incentive to "exaggerate" his message relative to ^ = 1=2. Because of this a
fully revealing equilibrium does not exist, while the most informative equilibrium always
involves an innite number of intervals where the senders message becomes more accurate
(i.e. the intervals are shorter) as his type becomes closer to 1=2.
Suppose that the sender is undercondent (c < p), which implies the sender believes that
his competence is lower than the receiver believes. From (2) and (3) we have yS() > yR()
for  2 [0; 1=2) and yS() < yR() for  2 (1=2; 1]. That is, now the receivers reaction
to a message is stronger than the sender wants it to be. For  lower than ^ the senders
desired action is higher than that of the receiver and for  higher than ^ the senders
desired action is lower. Contrary to the case of an overcondent sender, an undercondent
sender has incentive to "moderate" his message, which means that in equilibrium there are
a nite number of intervals, and that the message becomes less accurate as the senders
type becomes closer to 1=2.
Solving (6) and (7) for N = 2 and b = 0, we can conrm that there always exists a
binary equilibrium where the type space is divided into [0; 1=2) and [1=2; 1]. This has a
straightforward interpretation: whether the incentive to misreport is to "exaggerate" or
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"moderate", the sender does not have any incentive to misreport if his is given binary
messages (e.g. "yes or no", "agree or disagree"), since with only two messages he can
neither exaggerate nor moderate. Our observation can be summarized as follows:
Remark 2 For c 6= p, a fully informative equilibrium does not exist even in the absence
of bias (b = 0). Meanwhile, if there is no bias, then there always exists a binary partition
equilibrium, regardless of the level of over- or undercondence.
The following proposition states that both over- and undercondence in communication
have the remarkable similarity that, as they become severe, binary communication emerges
as the only way for the sender to transmit his private information.
Proposition 2 If b = 0, as the level of overcondence becomes extreme (c = 1 and p! 0)
the most informative equilibrium converges to the binary partition. When the degree of
undercondence is large enough, (c  p
2
) the only informative equilibrium is the one with
the binary partition.
Proof. See Appendix
When the senders overcondence becomes extreme, even the types very close to the
agreement type have strong incentive to "exaggerate" as his inuence on the receivers
action becomes innitesimally small. As a result the set of sender types (around the agree-
ment type) that are able to send relatively precise information shrinks, which e¤ectively
leaves binary communication as the only way to communicate credibly.6 On the other
hand, when the sender is undercondent a message from extreme types is more likely to be
precise owing to the incentive to "moderate". When the degree of undercondence is very
high, this incentive becomes larger even for the lowest ( = 0) and the highest ( = 1)
signal. If even those types prefer to pool with the lower half ( 2 (0; 1=2)) the higher half
( 2 [1=2; 1)) the only informative equilibrium is binary, which is the case for c  p
2
.
4.2 Undercondence and Communication Apprehension
As in most cheap talk models, there are multiple equilibria in our model. In Proposition 1
we have seen that if there is an equilibrium with N intervals there also exists an equilibrium
with N intervals for any 1  N  N . In the CS model with quadratic utilities and uniform
type distribution, both the receivers and the senders expected utilities are higher as the
6The probability that the senders type coincides exactly with the agreement type is zero.
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number of intervals is larger. Thus the most e¢ cient (and "informative") equilibrium under
given parameter values is the one that has the largest number of intervals.
In our model the calculation of expected utility can be potentially problematic because
we have not specied who holds the "correct" belief on the senders ability (the probability
that he observes the correct signal). Rather, neither partys belief (c nor p) may be true for
the above equilibrium construction to be valid. In what follows we compute each players
expected utility according to his/her own belief, without making an assumption on the
senders "true" competence, and base our "welfare" statement on the ex ante expected
utility.
In what follows we demonstrate through examples that when a sender is undercondent,
he may be better o¤ (in terms of his expected utility) in an equilibrium with a smaller
number of intervals, or in the uninformative equilibrium (i.e. no communication) than in
an informative equilibrium. This feature has not been previously pointed out, but may be
closely related to communication avoidance by shy or undercondent individuals studied
by psychologists (Richmond and McCroskey, 1997; Zimbardo, 1990). As the receiver is
shown to be always better o¤ in an informative equilibrium than in the uninformative
one, we point to a potential tension between the receiver and undercondent sender as to
whether to engage in communication in the rst place.
Moreover, we show that the receiver may also be better o¤ in an equilibrium with a
smaller number intervals. In particular, she may prefer communication with an even num-
ber of answers (such as binary communication, e.g. "yes" or "no") than that with an odd
number of answers (e.g. "yes", "Im not sure", or "no"). This is because an undercon-
dent sender is likely to send a moderate message (such as "Im not sure") with a high
probability, and in an extreme case most types may send it, which makes communication
hardly informative. In binary communication (or communication with an even number of
intervals) the undercondent sender does not report a moderate message (because such a
message is unavailable), and at the very least the receiver can nd out which side of the
type space ([0; 1=2); [1=2; 1]) the undercondent sender belongs to. Since the binary com-
munication equilibrium exists for any level of undercondence, asking a binary question
could be a powerful "tool" for the receiver when the sender is severely undercondent.
On the other hand, as we suggested earlier this property does not hold in communication
with an undercondent sender (c < p). Let us rst consider an example where the receiver
is worse o¤ in an equilibrium in more intervals. Suppose that c = 0:55; p = 1 and b = 0.
Then we have N = 3: the largest number of intervals supported in equilibrium is three, and
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the corresponding partition is given by f[0; 1=12); [1=12; 11=12); [11=12; 1]g where EUR =
 0:0483 and EUS =  0:0444. On the other hand in the equilibrium where the partition
has two intervals f[0; 1=2); [1=2; 1]g, we obtain EUR =  0:0208 and EUS =  0:0771
(Table 1). Thus the receiver is better o¤ in the equilibrium with two intervals, while the
undercondent sender is better o¤ in the equilibrium with three intervals.
N = 2 N = 3
EUR  0:0208  0:0483
EUS  0:0771  0:0444
Table 1: c = 0:55; p = 1
N = 1 N = 2
EUR  0:0833  0:0208
EUS  0:0833  0:0958
Table 2: c = 0:40; p = 1
Note that the length of an interval reects the precision of the information conveyed by
messages. The partition f[0; 1=12); [1=12; 11=12); [11=12; 1]g implies that a message is very
imprecise (the receivers posterior is such that  2 [1=12; 11=12)) with large probability
(0:8333), while only with small probability (0:1777) it is relatively precise (i.e. the posterior
is either  2 [0; 1=12) or  2 [11=12; 1]). In contrast, when the equilibrium partition is
f[0; 1=2); [1=2; 1]g the message is always moderately precise (the posterior is either  2
[0; 1=2) or  2 [1=2; 1]) compared with the other equilibrium. Overall the receiver, who
wants to minimize the expected variance of , prefers to be always moderately informed in
this example. The undercondent sender prefers the equilibrium with N = 3 because due
to undercondence he prefers an action around the one based on the prior yS(1=2) = 1=2,
and indeed the action is likely to be (with probability 0:8333) y = 1=2 in this equilibrium.
Suppose also that the sender is even more undercondent c = 0:4; p = 1 and b = 0.
We then have N = 2: one equilibrium is uninformative and the other has two intervals
f[0; 1=2); [1=2; 1]g. In the uninformative equilibrium EUR = EUS =  0:0833. In the
equilibrium with two intervals we have EUR =  0:0208 and EUS =  0:0958 (Table
2). Therefore while the receiver prefers the informative equilibrium with two intervals,
the sender prefers the uninformative equilibrium. The receiver prefers N = 2 to N = 1
because in the former equilibrium she can update her belief on the true state, which never
hurts her. On the other hand from the undercondent senders viewpoint the receivers
action varies "too much" according to his message since the receiver puts more weight on
the message than the sender wants her to. This reduces the senders utility because the
ex ante di¤erence between the receivers action and the senders ideal action is larger for
N = 1 than N = 2.
The ndings from the examples above can be summarized as follows:
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Remark 3 The expected utility of an undercondent sender may not be monotonic in
the number of intervals supported in equilibrium. In particular, a severely undercon-
dent sender (with a large di¤erence between p and c) may be better o¤ staying out of
communication than engaging in an informative equilibrium communication.
On the other hand it is easy to see that the receiver always prefers informative commu-
nication to no communication. The receiver chooses her action to maximize her expected
utility according to her posterior belief. An equilibrium with any non-degenerate intervals
enables the receiver to update her belief on the signal and gives higher expected utility
than the uninformative equilibrium where the decision depends only on the prior.
Remark 4 The receivers expected utility is higher in an equilibrium with two or more
intervals than in the uninformative equilibrium. Thus an undercondent sender and a
receiver may disagree on whether to engage in communication.
The receiver can put an appropriate weight on the message from the sender according
to p in order to maximize her expected utility. Therefore when she updates her belief on 
she is better o¤ than in the uninformative equilibrium. However, since his message has a
stronger inuence on the receivers action than optimal, the sender may prefer the uninfor-
mative equilibrium to an informative one especially when he is severely undercondent, as
we have seen in Table 2. This might provide a game theoretic insight into "communication
avoidance" or "shyness" discussed in the Introduction. Those concepts typically entail the
presumption that one may avoid communication when he should not. Indeed, if we assume
that the receiver has the "correct" assessment of the senders competence p, the expected
utilities of the two parties are identical, which implies that a severely undercondent sender
should engage in communication while he may choose to avoid it.
4.3 Overcondence and Multiple Equilibria
Let us conclude this section with the following proposition, which conrms that when the
players share the same condence (c = p) or the sender is overcondent (c > p) both
parties are better o¤ in an equilibrium with more intervals. Naturally this implies that, in
contrast to the case with an undercondent sender, whenever there exists an informative
equilibrium both parties prefer to engage in communication. The proposition is given more
generally for any bias b  0, which we focus on in the next section.
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Proposition 3 For given c  p and b  0, both the receivers and the senders expected
utilities are higher in an equilibrium with a larger number of intervals.
Proof. See Appendix
5 Condence and Bias
In the previous section, for the most part we assumed b = 0 so that we can clearly separate
e¤ects of over- and undercondence from bias. This section examines how they interact
with the senders bias (b > 0) in equilibrium communication. Specically, we will see that
overcondence increases the scope for information transmission with respect to bias, while
undercondence reduces it. Recall that when the receiver and the sender share the same
condence (c = p) there exists an informative equilibrium for all b 2 0; p
4

and thus an
informative equilibrium exists if b < bc=p  p4 .
5.1 Overcondence
In communication with a biased overcondent sender (c > p), substituting a0 = 0 and
a2 = 1 into (9) the equilibrium with two intervals is given by
0;
1
2
  2b
2c  p

;

1
2
  2b
2c  p; 1

:
Hence this equilibrium is informative for
a1 =
1
2
  2b
2c  p > 0;
which can be written as
b <
2c  p
4
= bc>p;
and we have bc>p > bc=p. Thus we have the following remark:
Remark 5 For any given the level of p, more undercondence allows more bias for infor-
mative equilibrium.
The intuition behind this is as follows. Comparing (1) and (2) we can see that when
c > p the senders desired action is more weighted towards the signal  and away from
the prior 1=2. Suppose that the senders type is low. He has two opposing incentives.
One is to "overstate" his type due to bias b, and the other is to "understate" due to
overcondence. These two kinds of informational distortion partly o¤set each other, so that
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he may have more incentive to reveal (partially). Therefore overcondence may mitigate
the level of conict and encourage information transmission. We will see later that slight
overcondence improves communication also when b is positive but small.
In fact, we are able to show that at least slight overcondence is strictly benecial also
for any b 2 (0; 1=4]:
Proposition 4 Suppose that there is an informative equilibrium for given levels of b > 0,
and p = c. Then for c = p +  with some small  > 0, there exists an equilibrium where
the receivers expected utility is higher than the case with c = p.
Proof. See Appendix
Given the same levels of competence p and intrinsic bias b, the receiver is better o¤ by
communicating with a slightly overcondent sender than a sender with common condence
c = p. In order to obtain the intuition, consider the simple case where the equilibrium has
two intervals f[0; a1) ; [a1; 1]g such that a1 = 12   2b2c p . The most desirable binary partition
for the receiver is a1 = 1=2 for which the expected ex post variance of the signal is lowest.
Note that this is the binary equilibrium partition for b = 0. For any b > 0 we have a1 6= 1=2
but since a1 is increasing in c, compared to the common condence case c = p, as c becomes
larger a1 is closer to the "best" binary partition a1 = 1=2. The receiver clearly favours
this change. In other words, overcondence has the same e¤ect as lower b. While excessive
overcondence reduces informativeness when b is small, slight overcondence always helps
as long as b is positive but not too large.7
5.2 Undercondence
Let us consider communication with a biased undercondent sender. We can compute
the upper bound of b such that an informative equilibrium exists, by focusing on the
equilibrium partition with two intervals. Solving (6) with N = 2, we obtain a0 = 0;
a1 =
1
2
  2b
2c p ; a2 = 1. First, suppose that
1
2
p < c < p, then we have a1 < 12 and a1 is
decreasing in b. The informative equilibrium partition is supported in equilibrium if a1 > 0
or8
b <
2c  p
4
:
7Blume, Board and Kawamura (2007) show that a small noise weakly increases the expected utilities
of both the sender and the receiver by allowing more information transmission to occur, as in this model.
8The probability that the senders type coincides exactly with the agreement type is zero.
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Second, if 0  c < 1
2
p, then a1 > 12 and a1 is increasing in b. Hence we must have a1 < 1,
which implies
b <
p  2c
4
.
Third, if c ! 1=2p then a1 ! 1 for any b > 0 so that the partition cannot be supported
in equilibrium for b > 0. To summarize, an informative equilibrium exists for
b < bc<p 
8<: 2c p4 if 12p < c < pp 2c
4
if 0 < c < 1
2
p
and (10)
b = 0 if c = 1
2
p: (11)
It is easy to see that bc<p < bc=p =
p
4
.
Remark 6 For any given level of p, undercondence allows less bias for informative equi-
librium.
The e¤ect of undercondence on communication is in stark contrast to that of over-
condence, with which more bias is allowed for informative equilibrium. Note that the
e¤ect of changes in c and p on the upper bound of the bias b for an informative equilibrium
varies according to the values of c and p. To see the intuition for (10) and (11), consider
the common condence case c = p and b > 0. In this case lower types can transmit more
precise information in equilibrium, as they have less incentive to overstate. Relative to this
benchmark, undercondence (c < p) weakens the incentive for the lower types to reveal
because it makes desired actions of lower types higher through the incentive to "moderate"
towards the prior 1=2 (i.e. incentive for lower types to "overstate"), which creates the same
type of informational distortion as b > 0 does. What happens to higher typesincentive
to reveal? Undercondence might lead to incentive to separate through the incentive to
"moderate" towards the prior (i.e. incentive for higher types to "understate") but when
the sender is only moderately undercondent (p
2
< c < p) the incentive to "understate" is
not strong enough for higher types to overcome the incentive to "overstate" caused by b. In
other words, both opposing incentives do not o¤set each other. Therefore, for this range,
undercondence discourages lower types to reveal and does not give enough incentive for
higher types to reveal more.
On the other hand, when the sender is extremely undercondent (0 < c < 1
2
p) higher
types may partially separate because the incentive to "moderate" for those types (i.e.
incentive to "understate") may now o¤set the positive bias due to b. Consequently, for
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this range of c the possibility of information transmission increases as the sender becomes
more undercondent.
6 Conclusion
This paper o¤ers a rst systematic analysis of condence in communication, including both
over- and undercondence. We have studied information transmission between a receiver
(decision maker) and a sender (informed party) who have asymmetric beliefs ("condence")
on the senders ability ("competence") to observe the state of nature. Overcondence in
communication is characterized by the senders incentive to "exaggerate", and undercon-
dence entails incentive to "moderate" his report. Consequently, signals closer to the
prior expectation are more accurately reported in communication with an overcondent
sender, whereas extreme singles are more accurately reported in communication with an
undercondent sender.
Those features generate some interesting insights, especially into communication with
undercondent individuals which has not been studied in the economics literature. We have
shown that an undercondent sender may prefer to stay out of informative communication,
even if there exists an informative equilibrium. This is the case even if undercondence
itself does not involve any physical or mental cost in engaging in information transmis-
sion. In other words, this paper o¤ers an alternative (game theoretic) explanation for
communication avoidance caused by undercondence. We have also shown that in commu-
nication with an undercondent sender, the receiver may be better o¤ in an equilibrium
which e¤ectively involves an even number of messages (actions). In particular, the receiver
may prefer binary communication ("yes or no") to ternary communication ("yes, Im not
sure, or "no"), because in the ternary communication equilibrium, a severely undercon-
dent sender would almost always send a moderate message ("Im not sure"), in which case
communication is seldom informative.
We have also shown that, when the sender is intrinsically biased in a particular direction,
overcondence on the senders side may mitigate the intrinsic bias, while undercondence
exacerbates it. This might explain why overcondence seems prevalent in various types of
expertise, even though undercondence itself (in the absence of bias) harms communication.
Overcondent experts do survive despite potential incentive to "exaggerate" reports: since
they may reveal more information when bias is inevitable, those seeking expert advice
might in fact welcome a certain degree of overcondence.
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7 Appendix: Proofs
7.1 Proposition 1
Proof.
Part i) This part of the proposition for the case where ^ =2 [0; 1] and c  p is implied by
Theorem 1 of CS, since yS() > yR() for all .
For c < p, consider a partition satisfying (6) and (7). The roots are complex and any
equilibrium partition must be an increasing sequence 0 = a0 < a1 < ::: < aN = 1 given by
ai = ^ + AN cos(i+ !N), (12)
where cos  = (2c   p)=p and ^ is the particular solution. The constants AN and !N are
determined by (7), that is,
^ + AN cos(!N) = 0 (13)
^ + AN cos(!N +N) = 1. (14)
Combining (13), (14) we have
cos(!N)
cos(!N +N)
=   ^
1  ^ . (15)
In order for (12) to be increasing in i we must have
!N 2 (   =2; 2 + =2 N) (16)
since, as the cosine function is strictly increasing between  and 2 and symmetric around
the extrema, for a0 < a1 we need  < =2 + !N ; and for aN 1 < aN we need 2 >
(N   1)+ =2 + !N . Any equilibrium must satisfy (15) and (16). Since (16) is empty for
large N , the number of intervals that can be supported in equilibrium is nite.
The range of the left hand side of (15) that also satises (16), when (16) is nonempty,
is
cos(!N)
cos(!N +N)
2

cos(   =2)
cos(   =2 +N) ;
cos(2 + =2 N)
cos(2 + =2)

:
The inmum of the range is negative and nondecreasing in N , and the supremum is non-
increasing in N . Thus if there exists !N that satises (15) and (16) for N , then there also
exists !N 1 that satises (15) and (16) for N 1, which implies the equilibrium with N 1
intervals.
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Part ii) From (2) and (3), for c  p and ^ 2 [0; 1], the sender has an outward bias in
Gordons (2010) terms, which means the senders ideal action given the signal is higher
than that of the receiver if for  > ^ and lower for  < ^. (2) and (3) also imply the
senders preference is continuous in y, and the receivers ideal policy is continuous in .
Thus we can directly apply Theorem 4 of Gordon (2010) to establish that there exists
an informative equilibrium with an innite number of intervals. Theorem 2 of Gordon
(2010) proves that, more generally, if there is an innite equilibrium then there exists an
equilibrium with N intervals for every positive integer N . Hence Part ii) of Proposition 1
holds.
7.2 Proposition 2
Proof. Let us rst show that the most informative equilibrium with an extremely over-
condent sender converges to the binary partition. Solving (6) explicitly for c > p with
a0 = 0 and aN = 1 we obtain
ai = ^ +
1  ^(1 BN)
AN  BN A
i +
 1 + ^(1  AN)
AN  BN B
i (17)
and equivalently with a00 = 1 and a
0
N = 0
a0i = ^ +
 BN   ^(1 BN)
AN  BN A
i +
AN + ^(1  AN)
AN  BN B
i;
where A and B are two distinct roots
A =
2c  p+ 2pc(c  p)
p
and B =
2c  p  2pc(c  p)
p
: (18)
Solving (17) for N !1 we obtain two sequences8<: ai = ^   ^Bi for ai 2 [0; ^)a0i = ^ + (1  ^)Bi for a0i 2 (^; 1] such that a00 = 1 .
Since 0 < B < 1, both sequences converge to ^. If we x c = 1 and p ! 0, then B ! 0.
Hence for b = 0 both a1 and a01 converge to ^ = 1=2, which implies that the innite
partition equilibrium converges to the binary equilibrium.
For c < p, solving (6) with b = 0, a0 = 0 and a3 = 1 (equilibrium with three intervals)
we obtain a1 =
2c p
4c p and a2 =
2c
4c p . We have a1  0 or equivalently a2  1 if c  p2 ,
which implies the equilibrium with three intervals does not exist and from Proposition
1 no equilibrium with three or more intervals exists. Thus we conclude that the binary
equilibrium with partition f[0; 1=2); [1=2; 1]g is the only informative equilibrium for c  p
2
.
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7.3 Proposition 3
Before we prove the proposition, we provide some useful lemmas and outline how we
construct the main proof. Let us call a sequence (a0; a1; :::; aN) that satises the arbitrage
condition (6) a "solution" to (6). The monotonicity condition (M) in CS requires that, for
given b, c, and p, if we have two solutions a+ and a++ with a+0 = a
++
0 and a
+
1 > a
++
1 , then
a+i > a
++
i for all i = 2; 3; ::: In other words, (M) says that starting from a0, all solutions to
(6) must move up or down together. Also, solving (6) in terms of a1
ai = ^ +
a1   ^(1 B)
A B A
i   a1   ^(1  A)
A B B
i;
where A and B are the distinct roots in (18). Since dai=da1 > 0 for all i = 2; 3; :::; N we
can see that the equilibrium partition of our model satises (M) for c  p.
In order to show that the expected utilities of both players are higher in an equilib-
rium with more intervals, CS deform the partition with N intervals to that with N + 1
intervals, continuously increasing the players expected utility throughout the deformation.
We follow this method, but we need to proceed by two step deformation, rather than one,
because when ^ 2 (0; 1] the deformation takes place towards the opposite directions for
the right-hand and left-hand sides of ^. Intuitively, as the number of interval increases,
each boundary type on the left hand side of ^ move to the left (except for a0 = 0) while
each boundary type of the right hand side of ^ move to the right (except for aN = 1). We
need to perform a di¤erent comparative statics for each case.
Let a(N) be the equilibrium partition of size N . We show that a(N) can be deformed
to a(N +1) by two steps, continuously increasing the playersexpected utility in each step.
Here we consider the case where ^ 2 (0; 1]. We omit the case where ^ =2 (0; 1] because the
Proposition for this case can be proven similarly, by using the rst step only.
Let the sub-partition of a(N) equal or below ^ be a(N)  (a0(N); a2(N); :::; aK(N))
where a0(N) = 0. Also, suppose that aK(N) is closer to ^ than aK+1(N) is, in other words,
^   aK(N) < aK+1(N)  ^. In the following we proceed in two steps:9
1. We x aK(N) and make the sub-partition (aK(N); aK+1(N); :::; aN(N)) deform con-
tinuously to (aK(N); aK+1(N + 1); aK+2(N + 1); :::; aN+1(N + 1)), increasing the ex-
pected utility.
2. We make the sub-partition (a0(N); a1(N):::; aK(N)) deform continuously to (a0(N +
1); a2(N + 1); :::; aK(N + 1)), increasing the expected utility.
9If ^   aK(N)  aK+1(N)  ^ then the two deformation steps must be reversed. See below.
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 If ^ aK(N)  aK+1(N) ^ then the rst step deforms (a0(N); a1(N); :::; aK(N); aK+1(N))
to (a0(N+1); a1(N+1); :::; aK+1(N+1); aK+1(N)) while xing aK+1(N), and the sec-
ond step deforms (aK+1(N); aK+2(N); :::; aN(N)) to (aK+2(N+1); aK+3(N+1); :::; aN+1(N+
1)). Except for this, the same method and result as the case where ^   aK(N) <
aK+1(N)  ^ apply.
Lemma 1 If a(N) and a(N + 1) are two equilibrium partitions for the same values of b,
c and p, then ai 1(N) < ai(N + 1) < ai(N):
Proof. See Lemma 3 (p.1446) in CS. The proof follows directly from (M).
The rst step of deformation is carried out as follows. Let (axK ; a
x
K+1; :::; a
x
i ; :::; a
x
N+1) be
the sub-partition that satises (6) for all i = K+1; K+2; :::; N with axK = aK(N), a
x
N = x
and axN+1 = 1. If x = aN 1(N) then a
x
K+1 = a
x
K = aK(N): If x = aN(N + 1) then we have
(aK(N); aK+1(N + 1); :::; aN(N + 1)), where (6) is satised for all i = K + 2; K + 3; :::; N .
We are going show that, if x 2 [aN 1(N); aN(N + 1)], which is again a non-degenerate
interval by Lemma 1, then the senders expected utility is strictly increasing in x.
In the second step, let (az0; a
z
1; :::; a
z
i ; :::; a
z
K) be the sub-partition that satises (6) for
i = 1; 2; :::; K   1; with az0 = 0 and azK = z. If z = aK(N) then azi = ai(N) for all
i = 0; 1; :::; K. If z = aK(N + 1) then azi = ai(N + 1) for all i = 0; 1; :::; K. We will show
that when z 2 [aK(N + 1); aK(N)], which is again a non-degenerate interval by Lemma 1,
the senders expected utility is strictly decreasing in z.
Lemma 2 Suppose that (a0; a1; :::; ai; :::; aN) is a solution to (6). Then for all i = 1; 2; :::; N 
1 if ai > (<)^ then ai   ai 1 < ai+1   ai (ai   ai 1 > ai+1   ai). If ai = ^ then
ai   ai 1 = ai+1   ai:
Proof. Rearranging (6) we have
(ai+1   ai)  (ai   ai 1) = 4cai + 4b  2c
p
  4ai + 2: (19)
The left hand side (ai+1   ai)  (ai   ai 1) = 0 if
4cai + 4b  2c
p
  4ai + 2 = 0)
4ai(c  p) =  4b+ 2c  2p)
ai =
1
2
  b
c  p  ^:
Since the right hand side of (19) is increasing in ai for c > p. Thus if ai > ^ then
(ai+1   ai)  (ai   ai 1) > 0; and if ai < ^ then (ai+1   ai)  (ai   ai 1) < 0.
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The above lemma says that an interval [ai; ai+1) is longer (shorter) than the previous
interval [ai 1; ai) when ai > (<)^. The following Lemma is similar but cannot be implied by
Lemma 2. Since by denition axK and a
z
K+1 are xed throughout the respective deformation,
(6) is not satised at ai = axK+1 for x 2 (aN 1(N); aN(N + 1)) or ai = azK for z 2
(aK(N + 1); aK(N)).
Lemma 3 axK+1   axK < axK+2   axK+1 and azK   azK 1 > azK+1   azK .
Proof. Suppose axK+1  ^. By construction ^ aK(N) < aK+1(N) ^. Since axK = aK(N)
and axK+2 > aK+1(N), we have ^  axK < axK+2  ^ and hence axK+1  axK < axK+2  axK+1 as
stated. Suppose axK+1 > ^: From Lemma 2 we have a
x
K+1   ~aK < axK+2   axK+1 where ~aK
is dened such that fai 1 = ~aK ; ai = axK+1; ai+1 = axK+2g satises (6). Since aK(N + 1) <
~aK < aK(N) = a
x
K from Lemma 1, we have a
x
K+1   axK < axK+2   axK+1. This proves the
rst part of the Lemma.
Similarly we have azK   azK 1  aK+1   azK where aK+1 is dened such that fai 1 =
azK 1; ai = a
z
K ; ai+1 = aK+1g satises (6). Lemma 1 implies azK+1 = aK+1(N + 1) < aK+1 <
aK+1(N). Hence we have azK   azK 1 > azK+1   azK .
Proof of Proposition 3. The senders expected utility for the rst part of deformation
is given by
EUS   c
"
KX
i=1
Z ai
ai 1

p
ai 1 + ai
2
+
1  p
2
  b  
2
d
+
N+1X
i=K+1
Z axi
axi 1

p
axi 1 + a
x
i
2
+
1  p
2
  b  
2
d
#
 (1  c)
"
KX
i=1
(ai   ai 1)
Z 1
0

p
ai 1 + ai
2
+
1  p
2
  b  
2
d
+
N+1X
i=K+1
(axi   axi 1)
Z 1
0

p
axi 1 + a
x
i
2
+
1  p
2
  b  
2
d
#
:
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It follows that
dEUS
dx

N+1X
i=K+1
daxi
dx
(
 c
"
p
axi 1 + a
x
i
2
+
1  p
2
  b  axi
2
 

p
axi + a
x
i+1
2
+
1  p
2
  b  axi
2
+p
Z axi
axi 1

p
axi 1 + a
x
i
2
+
1  p
2
  b  

d + p
Z axi+1
axi

p
axi + a
x
i+1
2
+
1  p
2
  b  

d
#
  (1  c)
"Z 1
0

p
axi 1 + a
x
i
2
+
1  p
2
  b  
2
d  
Z 1
0

p
axi + a
x
i+1
2
+
1  p
2
  b  
2
d
+ p(axi   axi 1)
Z 1
0

p
axi 1 + a
x
i
2
+
1  p
2
  b  

d
+p(axi+1   axi )
Z 1
0

p
axi + a
x
i+1
2
+
1  p
2
  b  

d

=
N 1X
i=K+1
daxi
dx
(axi+1   axi )(2c  p)p
4
(axi 1   2axi + axi+1) > 0 (20)
The inequality follows since da
x
i
dx
> 0 and from Lemmas 2 and 3 we have axi   axi 1 <
axi+1   axi ) axi 1   2axi   axi+1 > 0 for i = 1; 2; :::; N   1.
Let us look at the second part of deformation.
dEUS
dz

KX
i=1
dazi
dz
(
 c
"
p
azi 1 + a
z
i
2
+
1  p
2
  b  azi
2
 

p
azi + a
z
i+1
2
+
1  p
2
  b  azi
2
+p
Z azi
azi 1

p
azi 1 + a
z
i
2
+
1  p
2
  b  

d + p
Z azi+1
azi

p
azi + a
z
i+1
2
+
1  p
2
  b  

d
#
  (1  c)
"Z 1
0

p
azi 1 + a
z
i
2
+
1  p
2
  b  
2
d  
Z 1
0

p
azi + a
z
i+1
2
+
1  p
2
  b  
2
d
+ p(azi   azi 1)
Z 1
0

p
azi 1 + a
z
i
2
+
1  p
2
  b  

d
+p(azi+1   azi )
Z 1
0

p
azi + a
z
i+1
2
+
1  p
2
  b  

d

=
KX
i=1
dazi
dz
(azi+1   azi )(2c  p)p
4
(azi 1   2azi + azi+1) < 0 (21)
The inequality follows since we have da
z
i
dz
> 0 and Lemmas 2 and 3 imply azi   azi 1 >
azi+1   azi ) azi 1   2azi + azi+1 < 0. Therefore, EUS is increasing throughout the second
part of deformation for which z decreases from aK(N) to aK(N + 1).
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Since we have completed the deformation from a(N) to a(N + 1) by two steps while
increasing the expected utility, we conclude that the senders expected utility is higher in
an equilibrium with more intervals.
Following the above two-step deformation, the receivers expected utility for the rst
part of deformation is given by
EUR   p
"
KX
i=1
Z ai
ai 1

p
ai 1 + ai
2
+
1  p
2
  
2
d
+
N+1X
i=K+1
Z axi
axi 1

p
axi 1 + a
x
i
2
+
1  p
2
  
2
d
#
 (1  p)
"
KX
i=1
(ai   ai 1)
Z 1
0

p
ai 1 + ai
2
+
1  p
2
  
2
d
+
N+1X
i=K+1
(axi   axi 1)
Z 1
0

p
axi 1 + a
x
i
2
+
1  p
2
  
2
d
#
:
Note that the expected utility is identical to that of the sender, except that b = 0 and
c = p. Therefore, in order to show that the receivers expected utility is higher in an
equilibrium with more intervals, we can directly apply the the argument we have used for
the senders expected utility.
7.4 Proposition 4
Proof. Di¤erentiating (17) with respect to ^ we have
lim
c!p
dai
dc
=
 z }| {
i(i N)[ 2bN(1  i2 + iN +N2) + (2i N)p]
3Np2| {z }
+
> 0 for i = 1; 2; :::; N  1. (22)
For the inequality to follow, the term in the square brackets must be negative
 2bN(1  i2 + iN +N2)| {z }
 
+ (2i N)p < 0:
If this inequality holds for i = N   1 (so that the second term on the left hand side is the
largest), it is also satised for all i = 1; 2; :::; N   1. Thus substituting i = N   1 we obtain
b >
(N   2)p
2N2(N + 1)
: (23)
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The assumption that the equilibrium with N intervals is the most informative equilibrium
implies
p
2N(N   1)| {z }
Sup of bias for eqm with N intervals.
> b >
p
2N(N + 1)| {z }
Sup of bias for eqm with N+1 intervals
(24)
and it is easy to check that
p
2N(N + 1)
>
(N   2)p
2N2(N + 1)
:
This implies that in the most informative equilibrium (23) and hence (22) hold.
The receivers expected utility is given by
EUR =  p
NX
i=1
Z ai
ai 1

p
ai 1 + ai
2
+
1  p
2
  
2
d
 (1  p)
NX
i=1
(ai   ai 1)
Z 1
0

p
ai 1 + ai
2
+
1  p
2
  
2
d
Fix the level of p and let a(N; c) be the partition with N non-degenerate intervals and
p = c = c. Since b > 0 any informative equilibrium has a nite number of intervals
(Proposition 1). By continuity we can construct the equilibrium partition with N intervals
with c = c+  for small enough , which we denote by a(N; c+ ).
Now we can deform a(N; c) into a(N; c + ), increasing the receivers expected utility
throughout the deformation, as we have done in (20).
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